Boece – Book 5

By Geoffrey Chaucer

Bo5 p1 1 Sche hadde seyd, and torned the cours of
Bo5 p1 2 hir resoun to some othere thingis to ben treted
Bo5 p1 3 and to ben ispedd. Thanne seide I, “Certes
Bo5 p1 4 ryghtful is thin amonestynge and ful digne by
Bo5 p1 5 auctorite. But that thou seydest whilom that
Bo5 p1 6 the questioun of the devyne purveaunce is enlaced
Bo5 p1 7 with many othere questiouns, I undirstande
Bo5 p1 8 wel and prove it by the same thing.
Bo5 p1 9 But I axe yif that thou wenest that hap be
Bo5 p1 10 anything in any weys; and yif thou wenest
Bo5 p1 11 that hap be anything, what is it?”
Bo5 p1 12 Thanne quod sche, “I haste me to yelden
Bo5 p1 13 and assoilen to the the dette of my byheste, and
Bo5 p1 14 to schewen and openen the the
Bo5 p1 15 wey, by whiche wey thou maist comen ayein to thi contre. But
Bo5 p1 16 al be it so that the thingis whiche that thou axest
Bo5 p1 17 ben ryght profitable to knowe, yit ben thei
Bo5 p1 18 divers somwhat fro the path of my purpos; and
Bo5 p1 19 it is to douten that thou ne be makid weery
Bo5 p1 20 by mysweyes, so that thou ne maist nat
Bo5 p1 21 suffise to mesuren the ryghte weie.”
Bo5 p1 22 “Ne doute the therof nothing,” quod I; “for
Bo5 p1 23 for to knowen thilke thingis togidre, in the
Bo5 p1 24 whiche thinges I delite me gretly — that schal
Bo5 p1 25 ben to me in stede of reste, syn it nis nat to
Bo5 p1 26 douten of the thingis folwynge, whan every syde
Bo5 p1 27 of thi disputesoun schal han ben stedfast to me
Bo5 p1 28 by undoutous feyth.”
Bo5 p1 29 “Thanne,” seide sche, “that manere wol
Bo5 p1 30 I don the,” and bygan to speken ryght thus:
Bo5 p1 31 “Certes,” quod sche, “yif any wyght
Bo5 p1 32 diffynisse hap in this manere, that is to seyn that
Bo5 p1 33 ‘hap is bytydynge ibrought forth by foolisshe
Bo5 p1 34 moevynge and by no knyttynge of causes,’ I
Bo5 p1 35 conferme that hap nis ryght naught in no wise;
Bo5 p1 36 and I deme al outrely that hap nis but an idel
Bo5 p1 37 voys (as who seith, but an idel word), withouten
Bo5 p1 38 any significacioun of thing summitted
Bo5 p1 39 to that voys. For what place myght ben
Bo5 p1 40 left or duellynge to folie and to disordenaunce,
Bo5 p1 41 syn that God ledeth and
Bo5 p1 42 constreyneth alle thingis by ordre? For this
Bo5 p1 43 sentence is verray and soth, that ‘no thing hath
Bo5 p1 44 his beynge of naught,’ to the whiche sentence
Bo5 p1 45 noon of thise oolde folk ne withseide nevere; al
Bo5 p1 46 be it so that they ne undirstoden ne meneden it
Bo5 p1 47 nat by God, prince and bygynnere of wirkynge,
Bo5 p1 48 but thei casten as a maner foundement of subject
Bo5 p1 49 material (that is to seyn, of the nature of
Bo5 p1 50 alle resouns). And yif that any thing is
Bo5 p1 51 woxen or comen of no causes, thanne schal
Bo5 p1 52 it seme that thilke thing is comen or woxen of
Bo5 p1 53 nawght; but yif this ne mai nat ben don, thanne
Bo5 p1 54 is it nat possible that hap be any swich thing as
Bo5 p1 55 I have diffynysschid a litil herebyforn.”
Bo5 p1 56 “How schal it thanne be?” quod I. “Nys ther
Bo5 p1 57 thanne nothing that by right may ben clepid
Bo5 p1 58 other hap or elles aventure of fortune; or is ther
Bo5 p1 59 awght, al be it so that it is hidd fro the
Bo5 p1 60 peple, to whiche thing thise wordes ben
Bo5 p1 61 covenable?”
Bo5 p1 62 “Myn Aristotle,” quod sche, “in the book of
Bo5 p1 63 his Phisic diffynysseth this thing by schort
Bo5 p1 64 resoun, and nyghe to the sothe.”
Bo5 p1 65 “In whiche manere?” quod I.
Bo5 p1 66 “As ofte, quod sche, “as men don any thing
Bo5 p1 67 for grace of any other thing, and another thing
Bo5 p1 68 than thilke thing that men entenden to don
Bo5 p1 69 bytideth by some causes, it is clepid hap.
Bo5 p1 70 Ryght as a man dalf the erthe bycause of
Bo5 p1 71 tylyinge of the feld, and founde ther a
Bo5 p1 72 gobet of gold bydolven; thanne wenen folk
Bo5 p1 73 that it is byfalle by fortunous bytydynge. But
Bo5 p1 74 forsothe it nis nat of naught, for it hath his
Bo5 p1 75 propre causes, of whiche causes the cours unforseyn
Bo5 p1 76 and unwar semeth to han makid hap.
Bo5 p1 77 For yif the tiliere of the feeld ne dulve nat in the
Bo5 p1 78 erthe, and yif the hidere of the gold ne hadde
Bo5 p1 79 hyd the gold in thilke place, the gold ne
Bo5 p1 80 hadde nat ben founde. Thise ben thanne
Bo5 p1 81 the causes of the abregginge of fortuit hap,
Bo5 p1 82 the whiche abreggynge of fortuit hap cometh of
Bo5 p1 83 causes encontrynge and flowynge togidere to
Bo5 p1 84 hemself, and nat by the entencioun of the doere.
Bo5 p1 85 For neither the hidere of the gold ne the delvere
Bo5 p1 86 of the feeld ne undirstoden nat that the gold
Bo5 p1 87 sholde han ben founde; but, as I seide, it bytidde
Bo5 p1 88 and ran togidre that he dalf thare as that oothir
Bo5 p1 89 had hid the gold. Now mai I thus diffinysshen
Bo5 p1 90 hap: hap is an unwar betydinge
Bo5 p1 91 of causes assembled in thingis that ben
Bo5 p1 92 doon for som oothir thing; but thilke ordre,
Bo5 p1 93 procedinge by an uneschuable byndinge togidre,
Bo5 p1 94 whiche that descendeth fro the welle of
Bo5 p1 95 purveaunce that ordeyneth alle thingis in hir
Bo5 p1 96 places and in hir tymes, makith that the causes
Bo5 p1 97 rennen and assemblen togidre.
Bo5 m1 1 “Tigrys and Eufrates resolven and springen
Bo5 m1 2 of o welle in the cragges of the roche of the
Bo5 m1 3 contre of Achemenye, ther as the fleinge bataile
Bo5 m1 4 ficcheth hir dartes retorned in the breestis
Bo5 m1 5 of hem that folwen hem. And sone aftir the
Bo5 m1 6 same ryverys, Tigris and Eufrates, unjoignen
Bo5 m1 7 and departen hir watres. And if thei comen togidre
Bo5 m1 8 and ben assemblid and clepid togidre
Bo5 m1 9 into o cours, thanne moten thilke thingis
Bo5 m1 10 fleten togidre whiche that the watir of
Bo5 m1 11 the entrechaungynge flood bryngeth. The
Bo5 m1 12 schippes and the stokkes araced with the flood
Bo5 m1 13 moten assemblen; and the watris imedled
Bo5 m1 14 wrappeth or emplieth many fortunel happes
Bo5 m1 15 or maneris; the whiche wandrynge happes
Bo5 m1 16 natheles thilke enclynynge lowenesse of the
Bo5 m1 17 erthe and the flowinge ordre of the slydinge
Bo5 m1 18 watir governeth. Right so fortune, that semeth
Bo5 m1 19 as it fletith with slakid or ungoverned
Bo5 m1 20 bridles, it suffreth bridelis (that is to seyn,
Bo5 m1 21 to ben governed), and passeth by thilke
Bo5 m1 22 lawe (that is to seyn, by the devyne ordenaunce).”
Bo5 p2 1 “This undirstonde I wel,” quod I, “and I accorde
Bo5 p2 2 me that it is ryght as thou seist. But I
Bo5 p2 3 axe yif ther be any liberte of fre wille in this
Bo5 p2 4 ordre of causes that clyven thus togidre in
Bo5 p2 5 hemself, or elles I wolde witen yif that the
Bo5 p2 6 destinal cheyne constrenith the moevynges of
Bo5 p2 7 the corages of men.”
Bo5 p2 8 “Yis,” quod sche, “ther is liberte of fre wil,
Bo5 p2 9 ne ther ne was nevere no nature of resoun
Bo5 p2 10 that it ne hadde liberte of fre wil. For every
Bo5 p2 11 thing that may naturely usen resoun,
Bo5 p2 12 it hath doom by whiche it discernith and demeth
Bo5 p2 13 every thing; thanne knoweth it by itself
Bo5 p2 14 thinges that ben to fleen and thinges that ben
Bo5 p2 15 to desiren. And thilke thing that any wight
Bo5 p2 16 demeth to ben desired, that axeth or desireth
Bo5 p2 17 he; and fleeth thilke thing that he troweth be
Bo5 p2 18 to fleen. Wherfore in alle thingis that resoun
Bo5 p2 19 is, in hem also is liberte of willynge and of
Bo5 p2 20 nillynge. But I ne ordeyne nat (as who
Bo5 p2 21 seith, I ne graunte nat) that this liberte be
Bo5 p2 22 evenelyk in alle thinges. Forwhy in the sovereynes
Bo5 p2 23 devynes substaunces (that is to seyn,
Bo5 p2 24 in spiritz) jugement is more cleer, and wil nat
Bo5 p2 25 icorrumped, and myght redy to speden thinges
Bo5 p2 26 that ben desired. But the soules of men moten
Bo5 p2 27 nedes be more fre whan thei loken hem in the
Bo5 p2 28 speculacioun or lokynge of the devyne thought;
Bo5 p2 29 and lasse fre whan thei slyden into the bodyes;
Bo5 p2 30 and yit lasse fre whan thei ben gadrid
Bo5 p2 31 togidre and comprehended in erthli
Bo5 p2 32 membres; but the laste servage is whan that
Bo5 p2 33 thei ben yeven to vices and han ifalle fro the
Bo5 p2 34 possessioun of hir propre resoun. For aftir that
Bo5 p2 35 thei han cast awey hir eyghen fro the lyght
Bo5 p2 36 of the sovereyn sothfastnesse to lowe thingis
Bo5 p2 37 and derke, anon thei derken by the cloude of
Bo5 p2 38 ignoraunce and ben troubled by felonous talentz;
Bo5 p2 39 to the whiche talentz whan thei approchen
Bo5 p2 40 and assenten, thei helpen and
Bo5 p2 41 encrecen the servage whiche thei han
Bo5 p2 42 joyned to hemself; and in this manere thei ben
Bo5 p2 43 caytifs fro hir propre liberte. The whiche thingis
Bo5 p2 44 natheles the lokynge of the devyne purveaunce
Bo5 p2 45 seth, that alle thingis byholdeth and seeth fro
Bo5 p2 46 eterne, and ordeyneth hem everiche in here
Bo5 p2 47 merites as thei ben predestinat; and it is seid in
Bo5 p2 48 Greke that ‘alle thinges he seeth and alle thinges
Bo5 p2 49 he herith.’
Bo5 m2 1 “Homer with the hony mouth (that is to seyn,
Bo5 m2 2 Homer with the swete ditees) singeth that the
Bo5 m2 3 sonne is cler by pure light; natheles yit ne
Bo5 m2 4 mai it nat, by the infirme light of his bemes,
Bo5 m2 5 breken or percen the inward entrayles of the
Bo5 m2 6 erthe or elles of the see. So ne seth nat God,
Bo5 m2 7 makere of the grete werld. To hym, that loketh
Bo5 m2 8 alle thinges from an hey, ne withstondeth
Bo5 m2 9 no thinges by hevynesse of erthe, ne the
Bo5 m2 10 nyght ne withstondeth nat to hym by the
Bo5 m2 11 blake cloudes. Thilke God seeth in o strok
Bo5 m2 12 of thought alle thinges that ben, or weren, or
Bo5 m2 13 schollen comen; and thilke God, for he loketh
Bo5 m2 14 and seeth alle thingis alone, thou maist seyn
Bo5 m2 15 that he is the verrai sonne.”
Bo5 p3 1 Thanne seide I, “Now am I confowndide by
Bo5 p3 2 a more hard doute than I was.”
Bo5 p3 3 “What doute is that?” quod sche, “for certes I
Bo5 p3 4 conjecte now by whiche thingis thou art trubled.”
Bo5 p3 5 “It semeth,” quod I, “to repugnen and to
Bo5 p3 6 contrarien gretly, that God knoweth byforn alle
Bo5 p3 7 thinges and that ther is any fredom of liberte.
Bo5 p3 8 For yif so be that God loketh alle thinges
Bo5 p3 9 byforn, ne God ne mai nat ben desceyved
Bo5 p3 10 in no manere, thanne moot it nedes ben that
Bo5 p3 11 alle thinges betyden the whiche that the
Bo5 p3 12 purveaunce of God hath seyn byforn to comen.
Bo5 p3 13 For whiche, yif that God knoweth byforn nat
Bo5 p3 14 oonly the werkes of men, but also hir conseilles
Bo5 p3 15 and hir willes, thanne ne schal ther be no liberte
Bo5 p3 16 of arbitrie; ne certes ther ne may be noon
Bo5 p3 17 othir dede, ne no wil, but thilke whiche that the
Bo5 p3 18 devyne purveaunce, that ne mai nat ben disseyved,
Bo5 p3 19 hath felid byforn. For yif that thei
Bo5 p3 20 myghten writhen awey in othere manere
Bo5 p3 21 than thei ben purveyed, thanne ne sholde
Bo5 p3 22 ther be no stedefast prescience of thing to
Bo5 p3 23 comen, but rather an uncerteyn opynioun; the
Bo5 p3 24 whiche thing to trowen of God, I deme it felonye
Bo5 p3 25 and unleveful.
Bo5 p3 26 “Ne I ne proeve nat thilke same resoun (as who
Bo5 p3 27 seith, I ne allowe nat, or I ne preyse nat, thilke
Bo5 p3 28 same resoun) by whiche that som men wenen
Bo5 p3 29 that thei mowe assoilen and unknytten the
Bo5 p3 30 knotte of this questioun. For certes thei
Bo5 p3 31 seyn that thing nis nat to comen for that the
Bo5 p3 32 purveaunce of God hath seyn byforn that it is to
Bo5 p3 33 comen, but rathir the contrarie; and that is this:
Bo5 p3 34 that, for that the thing is to comen, that therfore
Bo5 p3 35 ne mai it nat ben hidd fro the purveaunce of
Bo5 p3 36 God; and in this manere this necessite slideth
Bo5 p3 37 ayein into the contrarie partie: ne it ne byhoveth
Bo5 p3 38 nat nedes that thinges betiden that ben
Bo5 p3 39 ipurveied, but it byhoveth nedes that thinges
Bo5 p3 40 that ben to comen ben ipurveied — but as
Bo5 p3 41 it were Y travailed (as who seith, that
Bo5 p3 42 thilke answere procedith ryght as though men
Bo5 p3 43 travaileden or weren besy) to enqueren the
Bo5 p3 44 whiche thing is cause of the whiche thing, as
Bo5 p3 45 whethir the prescience is cause of the necessite
Bo5 p3 46 of thinges to comen, or elles that the necessite of
Bo5 p3 47 thinges to comen is cause of the purveaunce. But
Bo5 p3 48 I ne enforce me nat now to schewen it, that
Bo5 p3 49 the bytidynge of thingis iwyst byforn is
Bo5 p3 50 necessarie, how so or in what manere that
Bo5 p3 51 the ordre of causes hath itself; although
Bo5 p3 52 that it ne seme naught that the prescience bringe
Bo5 p3 53 in necessite of bytydinge to thinges to comen.
Bo5 p3 54 “For certes yif that any wyght sitteth, it byhoveth
Bo5 p3 55 by necessite that the opynioun be soth of
Bo5 p3 56 hym that conjecteth that he sitteth. and
Bo5 p3 57 ayeinward also is it of the contrarie: yif the
Bo5 p3 58 opinioun be soth of any wyght for that he sitteth,
Bo5 p3 59 it byhoveth by necessite that he sitte.
Bo5 p3 60 Thanne is here necessite in the toon and in
Bo5 p3 61 the tothir; for in the toon is necessite of
Bo5 p3 62 syttynge, and certes in the tothir is necessite of
Bo5 p3 63 soth. But therfore ne sitteth nat a wyght for that
Bo5 p3 64 the opynioun of the sittynge is soth, but the
Bo5 p3 65 opinioun is rather soth for that a wyght sitteth
Bo5 p3 66 byforn. And thus, althoughe that the cause of the
Bo5 p3 67 soth cometh of that other side (as who seith,
Bo5 p3 68 that althoughe the cause of soth cometh of the
Bo5 p3 69 sittynge, and nat of the trewe opinioun),
Bo5 p3 70 algatis yit is ther comune necessite in that
Bo5 p3 71 oon and in that othir. Thus scheweth it that
Bo5 p3 72 Y may make semblable skiles of the purveaunce
Bo5 p3 73 of God and of thingis to comen. For althoughe
Bo5 p3 74 that for that thingis ben to comen therfore ben
Bo5 p3 75 thei purveied, and nat certes for thei be purveied
Bo5 p3 76 therfore ne bytide thei nat; yit natheles byhoveth
Bo5 p3 77 it by necessite that eyther the thinges to comen
Bo5 p3 78 ben ipurveied of God, or elles that the thinges
Bo5 p3 79 that ben ipurveyed of God betyden. And
Bo5 p3 80 this thing oonly suffiseth inow to destroien
Bo5 p3 81 the fredom of oure arbitre (that is to seyn,
Bo5 p3 82 of our fre wil).
Bo5 p3 83 “But certes now schewith it wel how fer fro
Bo5 p3 84 the sothe and how up-so-doun is this thing that
Bo5 p3 85 we seyn, that the betydynge of temporel thingis
Bo5 p3 86 is cause of the eterne prescience. But for to
Bo5 p3 87 wenen that God purveieth the thinges to comen
Bo5 p3 88 for thei ben to comen — what oothir thing is it
Bo5 p3 89 but for to wene that thilke thinges that
Bo5 p3 90 bytidden whilom ben cause of thilke
Bo5 p3 91 soverein purveaunce that is in God? And
Bo5 p3 92 herto I adde yit this thing: that ryght as whanne
Bo5 p3 93 that I woot that a thing is, it byhoveth by
Bo5 p3 94 necessite that thilke selve thing be; and eek
Bo5 p3 95 whan I have knowen that any thing schal
Bo5 p3 96 betyden; so byhovith it by necessite that thilke
Bo5 p3 97 same thing betide; so folweth it thanne that the
Bo5 p3 98 betydynge of the thing iwyste byforn ne may nat
Bo5 p3 99 ben eschued. And at the laste, yif that any
Bo5 p3 100 wyght wene a thing to ben oothir weyes
Bo5 p3 101 than it is, it nis nat oonly unscience, but it
Bo5 p3 102 is desceyvable opynioun ful divers and fer fro
Bo5 p3 103 the sothe of science. Wherfore, yif any thing be
Bo5 p3 104 so to comen that the betidynge of it ne be nat
Bo5 p3 105 certein ne necessarie, who mai witen byforn that
Bo5 p3 106 thilke thing is to comen? For ryght as science ne
Bo5 p3 107 may nat ben medled with falsnesse (as who
Bo5 p3 108 seith, that yif I woot a thing, it ne mai nat
Bo5 p3 109 ben fals that I ne woot it), ryght so thilke
Bo5 p3 110 thing that is conceyved by science ne may
Bo5 p3 111 nat ben noon other weies than as it is
Bo5 p3 112 conceyved. For that is the cause why that science
Bo5 p3 113 wanteth lesynge (as who seith, why that
Bo5 p3 114 wytynge ne resceyveth nat lesynge of that it
Bo5 p3 115 woot); for it byhoveth by necessite that every
Bo5 p3 116 thing be ryght as science comprehendeth it
Bo5 p3 117 to be.
Bo5 p3 118 “What schal I thanne seyn? In whiche manere
Bo5 p3 119 knoweth God byforn the thinges to comen,
Bo5 p3 120 yif thei ne ben nat certein? For yif that he
Bo5 p3 121 deme that thei ben to comen uneschewably,
Bo5 p3 122 and so may be that it is possible that thei
Bo5 p3 123 ne schollen nat comen, God is disseyved. But
Bo5 p3 124 not oonly to trowe that God is disseyved, but for
Bo5 p3 125 to speke it with mouthe, it is a felonous synne.
Bo5 p3 126 But yif that God woot that ryght so as thinges
Bo5 p3 127 ben to comen, so schollen they comen, so that he
Bo5 p3 128 wite egaly (as who seith, indifferently) that
Bo5 p3 129 thingis mowen ben doon or elles nat
Bo5 p3 130 idoon, what is thilke prescience that ne
Bo5 p3 131 comprehendeth no certein thing ne stable?
Bo5 p3 132 Or elles what difference is ther bytwixe the
Bo5 p3 133 prescience and thilke japeworthi devynynge of
Bo5 p3 134 Tyresie the divynour, that seide, ‘Al that I seie,’
Bo5 p3 135 quod he, ‘either it schal be or elles it ne schal nat
Bo5 p3 136 be?’ Or elles how mochel is worth the devyne
Bo5 p3 137 prescience more than the opinioun of mankynde,
Bo5 p3 138 yif so be that it demeth the thinges
Bo5 p3 139 uncertayn, as men doon, of the whiche
Bo5 p3 140 domes of men the betydinge nis nat
Bo5 p3 141 certein? But yif so be that noon uncertein
Bo5 p3 142 thing ne mai ben in hym that is right certeyn
Bo5 p3 143 welle of alle thingis, than is the betydinge
Bo5 p3 144 certein of thilke thingis whiche he hath wist
Bo5 p3 145 byforn fermely to comen. For whiche it folweth
Bo5 p3 146 that the fredom of the conseiles and of the
Bo5 p3 147 werkis of mankynde nis noon, syn that the
Bo5 p3 148 thought of God, that seeth alle thinges withouten
Bo5 p3 149 errour of falsnesse, byndeth and
Bo5 p3 150 constreyneth hem to o bytidynge by
Bo5 p3 151 necessite.
Bo5 p3 152 “And yif this thing be oonys igrauntid and
Bo5 p3 153 resceyved (that is to seyn, that ther nis no fre
Bo5 p3 154 wil), thanne scheweth it wel how gret destruccioun
Bo5 p3 155 and how gret damages ther folwen of
Bo5 p3 156 thingis of mankynde. For in idel ben ther thanne
Bo5 p3 157 purposed and byhyght medes to good folk, and
Bo5 p3 158 peynes to badde folk, syn that no moevynge of
Bo5 p3 159 fre corage and voluntarie ne hath nat
Bo5 p3 160 disservid hem (that is to seyn, neither
Bo5 p3 161 mede ne peyne). And it scholde seme
Bo5 p3 162 thanne that thilke thing is alther-worst whiche
Bo5 p3 163 that is now demed for alther-moost just
Bo5 p3 164 and moost ryghtful, that is to seyn that schrewes ben
Bo5 p3 165 punysschid or elles that good folk ben
Bo5 p3 166 igerdoned, the whiche folk syn that hir propre
Bo5 p3 167 wil ne sent hem nat to the toon ne to that othir
Bo5 p3 168 (that is to seyn, neither to good ne to harm), but
Bo5 p3 169 constreyneth hem certein necessite of
Bo5 p3 170 thingis to comen. Thanne ne schulle ther
Bo5 p3 171 nevere be, ne nevere were, vice ne vertu,
Bo5 p3 172 but it scholde rather ben confusion of alle
Bo5 p3 173 dissertes medlid withouten discrecioun. And yit
Bo5 p3 174 ther folweth anothir inconvenient, of the whiche
Bo5 p3 175 ther ne mai be thought no more felonous ne
Bo5 p3 176 more wikke, and that is this: that, so as the ordre
Bo5 p3 177 of thingis is iled and cometh of the purveaunce
Bo5 p3 178 of God, ne that nothing is leveful to the
Bo5 p3 179 conseiles of mankynde (as who seith that
Bo5 p3 180 men han no power to don nothing ne wilne
Bo5 p3 181 nothing), thanne folweth it that oure vices
Bo5 p3 182 ben referrid to the makere of alle good
Bo5 p3 183 (as who seith, thanne folweth it that God
Bo5 p3 184 oughte han the blame of our vices), syn he
Bo5 p3 185 constreyneth us by necessite to doon vices.
Bo5 p3 186 “Than nis ther no resoun to han hope in God,
Bo5 p3 187 ne for to preien to God. For what scholde any
Bo5 p3 188 wyght hopen to God, or why scholde he preien
Bo5 p3 189 to God, syn that the ordenance of destyne
Bo5 p3 190 whiche that mai nat ben enclyned knytteth
Bo5 p3 191 and streyneth alle thingis that men mai
Bo5 p3 192 desiren? Thanne scholde ther be don awey
Bo5 p3 193 thilke oonly alliaunce bytwixen God and men
Bo5 p3 194 (that is to seyn, to hopen and to preien). But
Bo5 p3 195 by the pris of ryghtwisnesse and of verray
Bo5 p3 196 mekenesse we disserven the gerdon of the
Bo5 p3 197 devyne grace whiche that is inestimable (that is
Bo5 p3 198 to seyn, that it is so greet that it ne mai nat ben
Bo5 p3 199 ful ipreysed). And this is oonly the manere
Bo5 p3 200 (that is to seyn, hope and preieris) for
Bo5 p3 201 whiche it semeth that men mowen spekyn
Bo5 p3 202 with God, and by resoun of supplicacion be
Bo5 p3 203 conjoyned to thilke cleernesse that nis nat
Bo5 p3 204 aprochid no rather or that men byseken it and
Bo5 p3 205 impetren it. And yif men ne wene nat that hope
Bo5 p3 206 ne preieris ne han no strengthis by the necessite
Bo5 p3 207 of thingis to comen iresceyved, what thing
Bo5 p3 208 is ther thanne by whiche we mowen ben
Bo5 p3 209 conjoyned and clyven to thilke sovereyne
Bo5 p3 210 prince of thingis? For whiche it byhoveth
Bo5 p3 211 by necessite that the lynage of mankynde,
Bo5 p3 212 as thou songe a litil herebyforn, be departed and
Bo5 p3 213 unjoyned from his welle, and failen of his
Bo5 p3 214 bygynnynge (that is to seyn, God).
Bo5 m3 1 “What discordable cause hath torent and unjoyned
Bo5 m3 2 the byndynge or the alliaunce of thingis
Bo5 m3 3 (that is to seyn, the conjunccions of God and
Bo5 m3 4 of man)? Whiche god hath establisschid so
Bo5 m3 5 gret bataile bytwixen these two sothfast or
Bo5 m3 6 verreie thinges (that is to seyn, bytwyxen the
Bo5 m3 7 purveaunce of God and fre wil) that thei ben
Bo5 m3 8 singuler and dyvided, ne that they ne wole
Bo5 m3 9 nat ben medled ne couplid togidre? But
Bo5 m3 10 ther nis no discord to the verray thinges,
Bo5 m3 11 but thei clyven alwey certein to hemself;
Bo5 m3 12 but the thought of man, confownded and over-throwen
Bo5 m3 13 by the derke membres of the body,
Bo5 m3 14 ne mai nat be fyr of his derked lookynge (that
Bo5 m3 15 is to seyn, by the vigour of his insyghte while
Bo5 m3 16 the soule is in the body) knowen the thynne
Bo5 m3 17 sutile knyttynges of thinges. But wherfore
Bo5 m3 18 eschaufeth it so by so gret love to fynden
Bo5 m3 19 thilke notes of soth icovered? (That is to
Bo5 m3 20 seyn, wherfore eschaufeth the thought of
Bo5 m3 21 man by so gret desir to knowen thilke notificaciouns
Bo5 m3 22 that ben ihid undir the covertures of
Bo5 m3 23 soth?) Woot it aught thilke thing that it angwisshous
Bo5 m3 24 desireth to knowe? (As who seith,
Bo5 m3 25 nay; for no man ne travaileth for to witen
Bo5 m3 26 thingis that he wot. And therfore the texte
Bo5 m3 27 seith thus:) But who travaileth to wite thingis
Bo5 m3 28 iknowe? And yif that he ne knoweth hem nat,
Bo5 m3 29 what sekith thilke blynde thoght? What is
Bo5 m3 30 he that desireth any thyng of which he wot
Bo5 m3 31 right naught? (As who seith, whoso desireth
Bo5 m3 32 any thing, nedes somwhat he knoweth of it,
Bo5 m3 33 or elles he ne coude nat desiren it.) Or who may
Bo5 m3 34 folwen thinges that ne ben nat iwist? And
Bo5 m3 35 thoughe that he seke tho thingis, wher schal
Bo5 m3 36 he fynde hem? What wyght that is al unkunnynge
Bo5 m3 37 and ignoraunt may knowe the forme
Bo5 m3 38 that is ifounde? But whanne the soule byholdeth
Bo5 m3 39 and seeth the heye thought (that is to
Bo5 m3 40 seyn, God), thanne knoweth it togidre the
Bo5 m3 41 somme and the singularites (that is to seyn,
Bo5 m3 42 the principles and everyche by hymself)? But
Bo5 m3 43 now, while the soule is hidd in the cloude and
Bo5 m3 44 in the derknesse of the membres of the body,
Bo5 m3 45 it ne hath nat al foryeten itself, but it withholdeth
Bo5 m3 46 the somme of thinges and lesith the
Bo5 m3 47 singularites. Thanne who so that sekith sothnesse,
Bo5 m3 48 he nis in neyther nother habite, for he
Bo5 m3 49 not nat al, ne he ne hath nat al foryeten;
Bo5 m3 50 but yit hym remembreth the somme of
Bo5 m3 51 thinges that he withholdeth, and axeth conseile,
Bo5 m3 52 and retretith deepliche thinges iseyn byforne
Bo5 m3 53 (that is to seyn, the grete somme in his
Bo5 m3 54 mynde) so that he mowe adden the parties
Bo5 m3 55 that he hath foryeten to thilke that he hath
Bo5 m3 56 withholden.”
Bo5 p4 1 Than seide sche, “This is,” quod sche, “the
Bo5 p4 2 olde questioun of the purveaunce of God. And
Bo5 p4 3 Marcus Tullius, whan he devyded the divynaciouns
Bo5 p4 4 (that is to seyn, in his book that he wrot
Bo5 p4 5 of dyvynaciouns), he moevede gretly this questioun;
Bo5 p4 6 and thou thiself hast ysought it mochel
Bo5 p4 7 and outrely and longe. But yit ne hath it nat
Bo5 p4 8 ben determined ne isped fermely and diligently
Bo5 p4 9 of any of yow. And the cause of this dirknesse
Bo5 p4 10 and of this difficulte is, for that the
Bo5 p4 11 moevynge of the resoun of mankynde ne
Bo5 p4 12 may nat moeven to (that is to seyn, applien
Bo5 p4 13 or joignen to) the simplicite of the devyne prescience;
Bo5 p4 14 the whiche symplicite of the devyne
Bo5 p4 15 prescience, yif that men myghte thinken it
Bo5 p4 16 in any manere (that is to seyn, that yif
Bo5 p4 17 men myghten thinken and comprehenden the
Bo5 p4 18 thinges as God seeth hem), thanne ne scholde
Bo5 p4 19 ther duelle outrely no doute. The whiche
Bo5 p4 20 resoun and cause of difficulte I schal assaye
Bo5 p4 21 at the laste to schewe and to speden, whan
Bo5 p4 22 I have first ispendid and answerd to the resouns
Bo5 p4 23 by whiche thou art ymoeved.
Bo5 p4 24 “For I axe whi thou wenest that thilke resoun
Bo5 p4 25 of hem that assoilen this questioun ne be
Bo5 p4 26 nat speedful inow ne sufficient; the whiche solucioun,
Bo5 p4 27 or the whiche resoun, for that it demeth
Bo5 p4 28 that the prescience nis nat cause of necessite
Bo5 p4 29 to thinges to comen, than ne weneth it
Bo5 p4 30 nat that fredom of wil be distorbed or
Bo5 p4 31 ylet be prescience. For ne drawestow nat
Bo5 p4 32 argumentz fro elleswhere of the necessite of
Bo5 p4 33 thingis to comen (as who seith, any oothir wey
Bo5 p4 34 than thus) but that thilke thinges that the
Bo5 p4 35 prescience woot byforn ne mowen nat unbetyde
Bo5 p4 36 (that is to seyn, that thei moten betide)?
Bo5 p4 37 But thanne, yif that prescience ne putteth
Bo5 p4 38 no necessite to thingis to comen, as thou thiself
Bo5 p4 39 hast confessed it and byknowen a litel
Bo5 p4 40 herebyforn, what cause or what is it (as
Bo5 p4 41 who seith, ther may no cause be) by
Bo5 p4 42 whiche that the endes voluntarie of thinges
Bo5 p4 43 myghten be constreyned to certein bytydynge?
Bo5 p4 44 For by grace of posicioun, so that thou mowe the
Bo5 p4 45 betere undirstonde this that folweth, I pose that
Bo5 p4 46 ther ne be no prescience. Thanne axe I,” quod
Bo5 p4 47 sche, “in as moche as aperteneth to that,
Bo5 p4 48 scholden thanne thingis that comen of fre wil
Bo5 p4 49 ben constreyned to bytiden by necessite?”
Bo5 p4 50 Boecius. “Nay,” quod I.
Bo5 p4 51 “Thanne ayeinward,” quod sche, “I
Bo5 p4 52 suppose that ther be prescience, but that it ne
Bo5 p4 53 putteth no necessite to thingis; thanne trowe I
Bo5 p4 54 that thilke selve fredom of wil schal duellen al
Bo5 p4 55 hool and absolut and unbounden. But thou wolt
Bo5 p4 56 seyn that, al be it so that prescience nis nat cause
Bo5 p4 57 of the necessite of bytydynge to thingis to
Bo5 p4 58 comen, algatis yit it is a signe that the thingis ben
Bo5 p4 59 to bytyden by necessite. By this manere
Bo5 p4 60 thanne, althoughe the prescience ne hadde
Bo5 p4 61 nevere iben, yit algate, or at the leste wey,
Bo5 p4 62 it is certein thing that the endes and bytydinges
Bo5 p4 63 of thingis to comen scholden ben necessarie. For
Bo5 p4 64 every signe scheweth and signifieth oonly what
Bo5 p4 65 the thing is, but it ne makith nat the thing that
Bo5 p4 66 it signifieth. For whiche it byhoveth first to
Bo5 p4 67 schewen that nothing ne bytideth that it ne
Bo5 p4 68 betideth by necessite, so that it mai apiere that
Bo5 p4 69 the prescience is signe of this necessite; or
Bo5 p4 70 elles, yif ther nere no necessite, certes
Bo5 p4 71 thilke prescience ne myghte nat ben signe
Bo5 p4 72 of thing that nis nat. But certes, it is now certein
Bo5 p4 73 that the proeve of this, isusteyned by stedfast
Bo5 p4 74 resoun, ne schal nat ben lad ne proeved by
Bo5 p4 75 signes, ne by argumentz itaken fro withoute, but
Bo5 p4 76 by causes covenable and necessarie.
Bo5 p4 77 “But thou mayst seyn, ‘How may it be that the
Bo5 p4 78 thingis ne betyden nat that ben ipurveied to
Bo5 p4 79 comen? But certes, ryght as we troweden
Bo5 p4 80 that tho thingis whiche that the purveaunce
Bo5 p4 81 woot byforn to comen, ne ben nat to
Bo5 p4 82 bytiden!’ But that ne scholde we nat demen; but
Bo5 p4 83 rathir, althoughe that thei schal betyden, yit ne
Bo5 p4 84 have thei no necessite of hir kynde to betyden.
Bo5 p4 85 And this maystow lyghtly aperceyven by this
Bo5 p4 86 that I schal seyn. For we seen many thingis whan
Bo5 p4 87 thei ben done byforn oure eyen, ryght as men
Bo5 p4 88 seen the cartere worken in the tornynge and in
Bo5 p4 89 atemprynge or adressynge of hise cartes or
Bo5 p4 90 chariottes, and by this manere (as who
Bo5 p4 91 seith, maistow undirstonden) of alle othere
Bo5 p4 92 werkmen. Is ther thanne any necessite (as who
Bo5 p4 93 seith, in our lookynge) that constreynith or
Bo5 p4 94 compelleth any of thilke thingis to ben don so?”
Bo5 p4 95 Boece. “Nay,” quod I, “for in idel and in veyn
Bo5 p4 96 were al the effect of craft, yif that alle thingis
Bo5 p4 97 weren moeved by constreynynge (that is to seyn,
Bo5 p4 98 by constreinynge of our eyen or of our sighte).”
Bo5 p4 99 Philosophie. “The thingis thanne,” quod
Bo5 p4 100 she, “that, whan men doon hem, ne han no
Bo5 p4 101 necessite that men doon hem, eek tho same
Bo5 p4 102 thingis, first or thei ben don, thei ben to comen
Bo5 p4 103 withoute necessite. Forwhy ther ben some
Bo5 p4 104 thingis to betyden, of whiche the eendes and the
Bo5 p4 105 bytydynges of hem ben absolut and quit of alle
Bo5 p4 106 necessite. For certes I ne trowe nat that any man
Bo5 p4 107 wolde seyn this: that tho thingis that men don
Bo5 p4 108 now, that thei ne weren to bytiden first or thei
Bo5 p4 109 weren idoon; and thilke same thinges,
Bo5 p4 110 althoughe that men hadden iwyst hem
Bo5 p4 111 byforn, yit thei han fre bytydynges. For
Bo5 p4 112 ryght as science of thingis present ne bryngith in
Bo5 p4 113 no necessite to thingis that men doon, right so
Bo5 p4 114 the prescience of thinges to comen ne bryngith
Bo5 p4 115 in no necessite to thinges to bytiden.
Bo5 p4 116 “But thou maist seyn that of thilke same it is
Bo5 p4 117 idouted, as whethir that of thilke thingis that ne
Bo5 p4 118 han noon issues and bytidynges necessaries, yif
Bo5 p4 119 therof mai ben any prescience. For certes
Bo5 p4 120 thei semen to discorden, for thou wenest
Bo5 p4 121 that yif that thingis ben iseyn byfore, that
Bo5 p4 122 necessite folwith hem; and yif necessite faileth
Bo5 p4 123 hem, thei ne myghten nat ben wist byforn; and
Bo5 p4 124 that nothing may be comprehended by science
Bo5 p4 125 but certein. And yif tho thinges that ne han no
Bo5 p4 126 certein bytydingis ben ipurveied as certein, it
Bo5 p4 127 scholde ben dirknesse of opinioun, nat sothfastnesse
Bo5 p4 128 of science. And thou wenest that it be
Bo5 p4 129 dyvers fro the holnesse of science that any
Bo5 p4 130 man scholde deme a thing to ben otherwyse
Bo5 p4 131 than it is itself.
Bo5 p4 132 “And the cause of this errour is that of alle the
Bo5 p4 133 thingis that every wyght hath iknowe,
Bo5 p4 134 thei wenen that tho thingis ben iknowe al only by the
Bo5 p4 135 strengthe and by the nature of the thinges that
Bo5 p4 136 ben iwyst or iknowe. And it is al the contrarye;
Bo5 p4 137 for al that evere is iknowe, it is rather
Bo5 p4 138 comprehendid and knowen, nat aftir his
Bo5 p4 139 strengthe and his nature, but aftir the
Bo5 p4 140 faculte (that is to seyn, the power and the
Bo5 p4 141 nature) of hem that knowen. And, for
Bo5 p4 142 that this schal mowen schewen by a schort
Bo5 p4 143 ensaumple, the same rowndnesse of a body,
Bo5 p4 144 otherweys the sighte of the eighe knoweth it,
Bo5 p4 145 and otherweys the touchynge. The lookynge, by
Bo5 p4 146 castynge of his bemys, waiteth and seeth fro afer
Bo5 p4 147 al the body togidre, withoute moevynge of
Bo5 p4 148 itself; but the touchynge clyveth and conjoyneth
Bo5 p4 149 to the rounde body, and moeveth aboute
Bo5 p4 150 the envyrounynge, and comprehendeth by
Bo5 p4 151 parties the roundnesse. And the man
Bo5 p4 152 hymself, ootherweys wit byholdeth hym, and
Bo5 p4 153 ootherweys ymaginacioun, and otherweyes
Bo5 p4 154 resoun, and ootherweies intelligence. For the
Bo5 p4 155 wit comprehendith withoute-forth the figure of
Bo5 p4 156 the body of the man that is establisschid in the
Bo5 p4 157 matere subgett; but the ymaginacioun comprehendith
Bo5 p4 158 oonly the figure withoute the
Bo5 p4 159 matere; resoun surmountith ymaginacioun
Bo5 p4 160 and comprehendith by an universel lokynge
Bo5 p4 161 the comune spece that is in the
Bo5 p4 162 singuler peces. But the eighe of intelligence is
Bo5 p4 163 heyere, for it surmountith the envyrounynge of
Bo5 p4 164 the universite, and loketh over that bi pure
Bo5 p4 165 subtilte of thought thilke same symple forme of
Bo5 p4 166 man that is perdurablely in the devyne thought.
Bo5 p4 167 In whiche this oughte gretly to ben considered,
Bo5 p4 168 that the heyeste strengthe to comprehenden
Bo5 p4 169 thinges enbraseth and contienith the
Bo5 p4 170 lowere strengthe; but the lower strengthe
Bo5 p4 171 ne ariseth nat in no manere to the heyere
Bo5 p4 172 strengthe. For wit ne mai no thing comprehende
Bo5 p4 173 out of matere ne the ymaginacioun ne loketh nat
Bo5 p4 174 the universel speces, ne resoun ne taketh nat the
Bo5 p4 175 symple forme so as intelligence takith it; but
Bo5 p4 176 intelligence, that lookith as aboven, whanne it
Bo5 p4 177 hath comprehended the forme, it knowith and
Bo5 p4 178 demyth alle the thinges that ben undir that
Bo5 p4 179 foorme; but sche knoweth hem in thilke
Bo5 p4 180 manere in the whiche it comprehendith
Bo5 p4 181 thilke same symple forme that ne may
Bo5 p4 182 nevere ben knowen to noon of that othere (that
Bo5 p4 183 is to seyn, to none of tho thre forseyde strengthis
Bo5 p4 184 of the soule). For it knoweth the universite of
Bo5 p4 185 resoun, and the figure of ymaginacioun, and the
Bo5 p4 186 sensible material conceyved by wit; ne it ne
Bo5 p4 187 useth nat nor of resoun ne of ymaginacioun ne
Bo5 p4 188 of wit withoute-forth; but it byholdeth alle
Bo5 p4 189 thingis, so as I schal seie, by o strook of
Bo5 p4 190 thought formely (withoute discours or
Bo5 p4 191 collacioun). Certes resoun, whan it lokith
Bo5 p4 192 any thing universel, it ne useth nat of
Bo5 p4 193 ymaginacioun, nor of wit; and algatis yit it
Bo5 p4 194 comprehendith the thingis ymaginable and
Bo5 p4 195 sensible. For reson is she that diffynyscheth the
Bo5 p4 196 universel of here conceyte ryght thus: man is a
Bo5 p4 197 resonable two-foted beest. And how so that this
Bo5 p4 198 knowynge is universel, yit nis ther no wyght that
Bo5 p4 199 ne wot wel that a man is a thing ymaginable
Bo5 p4 200 and sensible; and this same considereth wel
Bo5 p4 201 resoun; but that nis nat by ymaginacioun
Bo5 p4 202 nor by wit, but it lookith it by resonable
Bo5 p4 203 concepcioun. Also ymaginacioun, albeit so that
Bo5 p4 204 it takith of wit the bygynnynges to seen and to
Bo5 p4 205 formen the figures, algates althoughe that wit ne
Bo5 p4 206 were nat present, yit it envyrowneth and
Bo5 p4 207 comprehendith alle thingis sensible, nat by
Bo5 p4 208 resoun sensible of demynge, but by resoun
Bo5 p4 209 ymaginatyf. Seestow nat thanne that alle
Bo5 p4 210 the thingis in knowynge usen more of hir
Bo5 p4 211 faculte or of hir power than thei don of the
Bo5 p4 212 faculte or power of thingis that ben iknowe? Ne
Bo5 p4 213 that nis nat wrong; for so as every jugement is
Bo5 p4 214 the dede or the doyng of hym that demeth, it
Bo5 p4 215 byhoveth that every wyght performe the werk
Bo5 p4 216 and his entencioun, nat of foreyne power, but of
Bo5 p4 217 his propre power.
Bo5 m4 1 “The porche (that is to seyn, a gate of the
Bo5 m4 2 toun of Athenis there as philosophris hadden
Bo5 m4 3 hir congregacioun to desputen) — thilke porche
Bo5 m4 4 broughte somtyme olde men, ful dirke in hir
Bo5 m4 5 sentences (that is to seyn, philosophris that
Bo5 m4 6 hyghten Stoycienis), that wenden that ymages
Bo5 m4 7 and sensibilities (that is to seyn, sensible ymaginaciouns
Bo5 m4 8 or ellis ymaginaciouns of sensible
Bo5 m4 9 thingis) weren enprientid into soules fro
Bo5 m4 10 bodyes withoute-forth (as who seith that
Bo5 m4 11 thilke Stoycienis wenden that the sowle
Bo5 m4 12 had ben nakid of itself, as a mirour or a clene
Bo5 m4 13 parchemyn, so that alle figures most first
Bo5 m4 14 comen fro thinges fro withoute into soules,
Bo5 m4 15 and ben emprientid into soules); (Textus)
Bo5 m4 16 ryght as we ben wont somtyme by a swift
Bo5 m4 17 poyntel to fycchen lettres emprientid in the
Bo5 m4 18 smothnesse or in the pleynesse of the table of
Bo5 m4 19 wex or in parchemyn that ne hath no figure
Bo5 m4 20 ne note in it. (Glose. But now argueth
Bo5 m4 21 Boece ayens that opynioun and seith
Bo5 m4 22 thus:) But yif the thryvynge soule ne unpliteth
Bo5 m4 23 nothing (that is to seyn, ne doth nothing) by his
Bo5 m4 24 propre moevynges, but suffrith and lith subgit
Bo5 m4 25 to the figures and to the notes of bodies
Bo5 m4 26 withoute-forth, and yeldith ymages ydel and
Bo5 m4 27 vein in the manere of a mirour, whennes
Bo5 m4 28 thryveth thanne or whennes comith thilke
Bo5 m4 29 knowynge in our soule, that discernith and
Bo5 m4 30 byholdith alle thinges? And whennes is
Bo5 m4 31 thilke strengthe that byholdeth the singuler
Bo5 m4 32 thinges? Or whennes is the strengthe that
Bo5 m4 33 devydeth thinges iknowe; and thilke strengthe
Bo5 m4 34 that gadreth togidre the thingis devyded; and
Bo5 m4 35 the strengthe that chesith his entrechaunged
Bo5 m4 36 wey? For somtyme it hevyth up the heved (that
Bo5 m4 37 is to seyn, that it hevyth up the entencioun) to
Bo5 m4 38 ryght heye thinges, and somtyme it descendith
Bo5 m4 39 into ryght lowe thinges; and whan
Bo5 m4 40 it retorneth into hymself it reproveth and
Bo5 m4 41 destroyeth the false thingis by the trewe
Bo5 m4 42 thinges. Certes this strengthe is cause more
Bo5 m4 43 efficient, and mochel more myghty to seen and
Bo5 m4 44 to knowe thinges, than thilke cause that suffrith
Bo5 m4 45 and resceyveth the notes and the figures
Bo5 m4 46 empressid in manere of matere. Algatis the
Bo5 m4 47 passion (that is to seyn, the suffraunce or the wit)
Bo5 m4 48 in the quyke body goth byforn, excitynge and
Bo5 m4 49 moevynge the strengthes of the thought,
Bo5 m4 50 ryght so as whan that cleernesse smyteth
Bo5 m4 51 the eyen and moeveth hem to seen, or
Bo5 m4 52 ryght so as voys or soun hurteleth to the eres
Bo5 m4 53 and commoeveth hem to herkne; than is the
Bo5 m4 54 strengthe of the thought imoevid and excited,
Bo5 m4 55 and clepith forth to semblable moevyngis the
Bo5 m4 56 speces that it halt withynne itself, and addith
Bo5 m4 57 tho speces to the notes and to the thinges
Bo5 m4 58 withoute-forth, and medleth the ymagis of
Bo5 m4 59 thinges withoute-forth to the foormes ihidd
Bo5 m4 60 withynne hymself.
Bo5 p5 1 “But what yif that in bodyes to ben feled
Bo5 p5 2 (that is to seyn, in the takynge of knowlechynge
Bo5 p5 3 of bodily thinges), and albeit so that the
Bo5 p5 4 qualites of bodies that ben object fro withoute-forth
Bo5 p5 5 moeven and entalenten the instrumentz
Bo5 p5 6 of the wittes, and albeit so that the passioun
Bo5 p5 7 of the body (that is to seyn, the wit or the suffraunce)
Bo5 p5 8 goth toforn the strengthe of the wirkynge
Bo5 p5 9 corage, the whiche passioun or
Bo5 p5 10 sufraunce clepith forth the dede of the
Bo5 p5 11 thought in hymself and moeveth and exciteth
Bo5 p5 12 in this menewhile the formes that resten
Bo5 p5 13 within-forth, and yif that in sensible bodies,
Bo5 p5 14 as I have seid, our corage nis nat ytaught or
Bo5 p5 15 empriented by passioun to knowe thise thinges,
Bo5 p5 16 but demeth and knoweth of his owne strengthe
Bo5 p5 17 the passioun or suffrance subject to the body —
Bo5 p5 18 moche more than tho thingis that ben absolut
Bo5 p5 19 and quit fro alle talentz or affecciouns of
Bo5 p5 20 bodyes (as God or his aungelis) ne folwen
Bo5 p5 21 nat in discernynge thinges object fro withoute-forth,
Bo5 p5 22 but thei acomplissen and speden
Bo5 p5 23 the dede of hir thought. By this resoun,
Bo5 p5 24 thanne, ther comen many maner knowynges to
Bo5 p5 25 dyverse and differynge substaunces. For the
Bo5 p5 26 wit of the body, the whiche wit is naked and
Bo5 p5 27 despoiled of alle oothre knowynges — thilke
Bo5 p5 28 wit cometh to beestis that ne mowen nat
Bo5 p5 29 moeven hemself her and ther, as oistres
Bo5 p5 30 and muscles and oothir swich schellefyssche
Bo5 p5 31 of the see that clyven and ben norisschid
Bo5 p5 32 to roches. But the ymaginacioun cometh
Bo5 p5 33 to remuable bestis, that semen to han talent to
Bo5 p5 34 fleen or to desiren any thing. But resoun is al
Bo5 p5 35 oonly to the lynage of mankynde, ryght as
Bo5 p5 36 intelligence is oonly the devyne nature. Of
Bo5 p5 37 whiche it folweth that thilke knowynge is more
Bo5 p5 38 worth than thise oothre, syn it knoweth by his
Bo5 p5 39 propre nature nat oonly his subget (as who
Bo5 p5 40 seith, it ne knoweth nat al oonly that apertenith
Bo5 p5 41 properly to his knowinge) but it knoweth
Bo5 p5 42 the subjectz of alle othre knowynges.
Bo5 p5 43 “But how schal it thanne be, yif that wit and
Bo5 p5 44 ymaginacioun stryven ayein resonynge and seyn
Bo5 p5 45 that, of thilke universel thingis that resoun
Bo5 p5 46 weneth to seen, that it nis ryght naught? For wit
Bo5 p5 47 and ymaginacioun seyn that that that is sensible
Bo5 p5 48 or ymaginable, it ne mai nat ben universel;
Bo5 p5 49 thanne is either the jugement of resoun
Bo5 p5 50 soth, ne that ther nis no thing sensible; or
Bo5 p5 51 elles, for that resoun woot wel that many
Bo5 p5 52 thinges ben subject to wit and to ymaginacioun,
Bo5 p5 53 thanne is the concepcioun of resoun veyn and
Bo5 p5 54 fals, whiche that lokith and comprehendith that
Bo5 p5 55 that is sensible and singuler as universel. And yif
Bo5 p5 56 that resoun wolde answere ayein to thise two
Bo5 p5 57 (that is to seyn, to wit and to ymaginacioun),
Bo5 p5 58 and seyn that sothly sche hirselve (that is to
Bo5 p5 59 seyn, resoun) lokith and comprehendith,
Bo5 p5 60 by resoun of universalite, bothe that that is
Bo5 p5 61 sensible and that that is ymaginable;
Bo5 p5 62 and that thilke two (that is to seyn, wit and
Bo5 p5 63 ymaginacioun) ne mowen nat strecchen ne
Bo5 p5 64 enhaunsen hemself to knowynge of universalite,
Bo5 p5 65 for that the knowynge of hem ne mai exceden ne
Bo5 p5 66 surmounten the bodily figures: certes of the
Bo5 p5 67 knowynge of thinges, men oughten rather yeven
Bo5 p5 68 credence to the more stidfast and to the mor
Bo5 p5 69 parfit jugement; in this manere stryvynge,
Bo5 p5 70 thanne, we that han strengthe of resonynge
Bo5 p5 71 and of ymagynynge and of wit (that is to
Bo5 p5 72 seyn, by resoun and by imagynacioun and by
Bo5 p5 73 wit), we scholde rathir preise the cause of resoun
Bo5 p5 74 (as who seith, than the cause of wit and of
Bo5 p5 75 ymaginacioun).
Bo5 p5 76 “Semblable thing is it, that the resoun of
Bo5 p5 77 mankynde ne weneth nat that the devyne
Bo5 p5 78 intelligence byholdeth or knoweth thingis to
Bo5 p5 79 comen, but ryght as the resoun of
Bo5 p5 80 mankynde knoweth hem. For thou arguist
Bo5 p5 81 and seist thus: that if it ne seme nat to men
Bo5 p5 82 that some thingis han certeyn and necessarie
Bo5 p5 83 bytydynges, thei ne mowen nat ben wist byforn
Bo5 p5 84 certeinly to betyden, and thanne nis ther no
Bo5 p5 85 prescience of thilke thinges; and yif we trowe
Bo5 p5 86 that prescience be in thise thingis, thanne is ther
Bo5 p5 87 nothing that it ne bytydeth by necessite. But
Bo5 p5 88 certes yif we myghten han the jugement of
Bo5 p5 89 the devyne thoght, as we ben parsoners of
Bo5 p5 90 resoun, ryght so as we han demyd that it
Bo5 p5 91 byhovith that ymaginacioun and wit ben
Bo5 p5 92 bynethe resoun, ryght so wolde we demen that
Bo5 p5 93 it were ryghtfull thing that mannys resoun
Bo5 p5 94 oughte to summytten itself and to ben bynethe
Bo5 p5 95 the devyne thought. For whiche yif that we
Bo5 p5 96 mowen (as who seith that, if that we mowen,
Bo5 p5 97 I conseile that) we enhaunse us into the heighte
Bo5 p5 98 of thilke soverein intelligence; for ther schal
Bo5 p5 99 resoun wel seen that that it ne mai nat
Bo5 p5 100 byholden in itself, and certes that is this:
Bo5 p5 101 in what manere the prescience of God
Bo5 p5 102 seeth alle thinges certeins and diffinyssched,
Bo5 p5 103 althoughe thei ne han no certein issues or
Bo5 p5 104 bytydyngis; ne this nis noon opinioun, but it is
Bo5 p5 105 rather the simplicite of the soverein science,
Bo5 p5 106 that nis nat enclosed nor ischet withinne none
Bo5 p5 107 boundes.
Bo5 m5 1 “The beestes passen by the erthes be ful
Bo5 m5 2 diverse figures. For some of hem han hir bodyes
Bo5 m5 3 straught, and crepyn in the dust, and drawen
Bo5 m5 4 aftir hem a traas or a furwe icontynued (that
Bo5 m5 5 is to sein, as naddres or snakes); and oothre
Bo5 m5 6 beestis by the wandrynge lyghtnesse of hir
Bo5 m5 7 wynges beten the wyndes, and overswymmen
Bo5 m5 8 the spaces of the longe eir by moyst fleynge;
Bo5 m5 9 and oothere beestes gladen hemself to diggen
Bo5 m5 10 hir traas or hir steppys in the erthe
Bo5 m5 11 with hir goinges or with hir feet, and to
Bo5 m5 12 gon either by the grene feeldes or elles to
Bo5 m5 13 walken undir the wodes. And al be it so that
Bo5 m5 14 thou seest that thei alle discorden by diverse
Bo5 m5 15 foormes, algatis hir faces enclyned hevyeth hir
Bo5 m5 16 dulle wittes. Only the lynage of man heveth
Bo5 m5 17 heyest his heie heved, and stondith light with
Bo5 m5 18 his upryght body, and byholdeth the erthes
Bo5 m5 19 undir hym. And, but yif thou, erthly man,
Bo5 m5 20 waxest yvel out of thi wit, this figure
Bo5 m5 21 amonesteth the, that axest the hevene with
Bo5 m5 22 thi ryghte visage and hast areised thi forheved,
Bo5 m5 23 to beren up an hye thi corage, so that thi thought
Bo5 m5 24 ne be nat ihevyed ne put lowe undir fote, syn
Bo5 m5 25 that thi body is so heyghe areysed.
Bo5 m1 1 “Therfore thanne, as I have schewed a litel
Bo5 p6 2 herebyforne that alle thing that is iwist nis nat
Bo5 p6 3 knowen by his nature propre, but by the nature
Bo5 p6 4 of hem that comprehenden it, lat us loke
Bo5 p6 5 now, in as mochil as it is leveful to us (as who
Bo5 p6 6 seith, lat us loke now as we mowen) whiche that
Bo5 p6 7 the estat is of the devyne substaunce; so that
Bo5 p6 8 we mowe eek knowen what his science is. The
Bo5 p6 9 comune jugement of alle creatures resonables
Bo5 p6 10 thanne is this: that God is eterne.
Bo5 p6 11 Lat us considere thanne what is eternite;
Bo5 p6 12 for certes that schal schewen us togidre the
Bo5 p6 13 devyne nature and the devyne science. Eternite,
Bo5 p6 14 thanne, is parfit possessioun and al togidre
Bo5 p6 15 of lif interminable; and that scheweth. more
Bo5 p6 16 cleerly by the comparysoun or collacioun of
Bo5 p6 17 temporel thinges. For alle thing that lyveth in
Bo5 p6 18 tyme, it is present and procedith fro preteritz
Bo5 p6 19 into futures (that is to seyn, fro tyme passed
Bo5 p6 20 into tyme comynge), ne ther nis nothing
Bo5 p6 21 establisshed in tyme that mai enbrasen togidre
Bo5 p6 22 al the space of his lif. For certis yit ne
Bo5 p6 23 hath it nat taken the tyme of tomorwe, and it
Bo5 p6 24 hath lost that of yusterday, and certes in the
Bo5 p6 25 lif of this dai ye ne lyve namore but right
Bo5 p6 26 as in this moevable and transitorie moment.
Bo5 p6 27 Thanne thilke thing that suffreth temporel condicioun,
Bo5 p6 28 althoughe that it nevere bygan to
Bo5 p6 29 be, ne thoughe it nevere ne cese for to be,
Bo5 p6 30 as Aristotile deemed of the world, and
Bo5 p6 31 althoughe that the lif of it be strecchid with
Bo5 p6 32 infinite of tyme; yit algatis nis it no swich thing
Bo5 p6 33 that men mighten trowen by ryght that it is
Bo5 p6 34 eterne. For althouhe that it comprehende and
Bo5 p6 35 embrase the space of lif infinit, yit algatis ne
Bo5 p6 36 enbraseth it nat the space of the lif al togidre; for
Bo5 p6 37 it ne hath nat the futuris (that ne ben nat yit),
Bo5 p6 38 ne it ne hath no lengere the preteritz (that
Bo5 p6 39 ben idoon or ipassed). But thilke thing,
Bo5 p6 40 thanne, that hath and comprehendith
Bo5 p6 41 togidre al the plente of the lif interminable,
Bo5 p6 42 to whom ther ne faileth naught of the future, and
Bo5 p6 43 to whom ther nis noght of the preteryt escaped
Bo5 p6 44 nor ipassed, thilke same is iwitnessed and
Bo5 p6 45 iproevid by right to ben eterne; and it byhovith
Bo5 p6 46 by necessite that thilke thing be alwey present to
Bo5 p6 47 hymself and compotent (as who seith, alwey
Bo5 p6 48 present to hymselve and so myghty that al be
Bo5 p6 49 right at his plesaunce), and that he have al
Bo5 p6 50 present the infinit of the moevable tyme.
Bo5 p6 51 “Wherfore som men trowen wrongfully
Bo5 p6 52 that, whan thei heren that it semede to Plato that
Bo5 p6 53 this world ne hadde nevere bygynnynge of
Bo5 p6 54 tyme, ne that it nevere schal han failynge, thei
Bo5 p6 55 wenen in this manere that this world be makid
Bo5 p6 56 coeterne with his makere. (As who seith, thei
Bo5 p6 57 wene that this world and God ben makid
Bo5 p6 58 togidre eterne, and that is a wrongful wenynge.)
Bo5 p6 59 For other thing is it to ben ilad
Bo5 p6 60 by lif interminable, as Plato grauntide to
Bo5 p6 61 the world, and oothir is it to enbrace
Bo5 p6 62 togidre al the presence of the lif intermynable,
Bo5 p6 63 the whiche thing it is cleer and manyfest that it
Bo5 p6 64 is propre to the devyne thought. Ne it ne
Bo5 p6 65 scholde nat semen to us that God is eldere than
Bo5 p6 66 thinges that ben imaked by quantite of tyme, but
Bo5 p6 67 rathir by the proprete of his simple nature. For
Bo5 p6 68 this ilke infinit moevyng of temporel thinges
Bo5 p6 69 folweth this presentarie estat of the lif
Bo5 p6 70 inmoevable; and, so as it ne mai nat
Bo5 p6 71 contrefetin it ne feynen it, ne be evene lik
Bo5 p6 72 to it, [fro] the immoevablete (that is to sein, that
Bo5 p6 73 is in the eternite of God) it faileth and fallith into
Bo5 p6 74 moevynge, [and] fro the simplicite of the
Bo5 p6 75 presence of [God] disencresith into the infinit
Bo5 p6 76 quantite of future and of preterit; and so as it ne
Bo5 p6 77 mai nat han togidre al the plente of the lif,
Bo5 p6 78 algates yit, for as moche as it ne ceseth nevere for
Bo5 p6 79 to ben in som manere, it semyth somdel to
Bo5 p6 80 us that it folwith and resembleth thilke
Bo5 p6 81 thing that it ne mai nat atayne to ne
Bo5 p6 82 fulfillen, and byndeth itself to som maner
Bo5 p6 83 presence of this litle and swift moment, the
Bo5 p6 84 whiche presence of this litle and swifte moment,
Bo5 p6 85 for that it bereth a maner ymage or liknesse of
Bo5 p6 86 the ai duellynge presence of God, it grauntith to
Bo5 p6 87 swich manere thinges as it betydith to that it
Bo5 p6 88 semeth hem that thise thinges han iben and ben.
Bo5 p6 89 And for that the presence of swiche litil
Bo5 p6 90 moment ne mai nat duelle, therfore it
Bo5 p6 91 ravysschide and took the infynit wey of
Bo5 p6 92 tyme (that is to seyn, by successioun). And by
Bo5 p6 93 this manere is it idoon for that it sholde contynue
Bo5 p6 94 the lif in goinge, of the whiche lif it ne myght nat
Bo5 p6 95 enbrace the plente in duellinge. And forthi yif
Bo5 p6 96 we wollen putten worthi names to thinges and
Bo5 p6 97 folwen Plato, lat us seyen thanne sothly that God
Bo5 p6 98 is ‘eterne,’ and that the world is ‘perpetuel.’
Bo5 p6 99 “Thanne, syn that every jugement knoweth
Bo5 p6 100 and comprehendith by his owne nature
Bo5 p6 101 thinges that ben subgect unto hym,
Bo5 p6 102 ther is sothly to God alweys an eterne
Bo5 p6 103 and presentarie estat; and the science of hym, that
Bo5 p6 104 overpasseth alle temporel moevement, duelleth
Bo5 p6 105 in the simplicite of his presence, and embraceth
Bo5 p6 106 and considereth alle the infynit spaces of tymes
Bo5 p6 107 preteritz and futures, and lokith in his simple
Bo5 p6 108 knowynge alle thinges of preterit ryght as thei
Bo5 p6 109 weren idoon presently ryght now. Yif
Bo5 p6 110 thou wolt thanne thinken and avise the
Bo5 p6 111 prescience by whiche it knoweth alle
Bo5 p6 112 thinges, thou ne schalt naught demen it as
Bo5 p6 113 prescience of thinges to comen, but thou schalt
Bo5 p6 114 demen more ryghtfully that it is science of
Bo5 p6 115 presence or of instaunce that nevere ne faileth.
Bo5 p6 116 For whiche it nis nat ycleped ‘previdence,’ but it
Bo5 p6 117 sholde rathir ben clepid ‘purveaunce,’ that is
Bo5 p6 118 establisshed ful fer fro ryght lowe thinges, and
Bo5 p6 119 byholdeth fro afer alle thingis, right as it
Bo5 p6 120 were fro the heye heighte of thinges.
Bo5 p6 121 “Why axestow thanne, or whi desputestow
Bo5 p6 122 thanne, that thilke thingis ben doon
Bo5 p6 123 by necessite whiche that ben yseyn and knowen
Bo5 p6 124 by the devyne sighte, syn that forsothe men ne
Bo5 p6 125 maken nat thilke thinges necessarie whiche that
Bo5 p6 126 thei seen ben idoon in hir sighte? For addith thi
Bo5 p6 127 byholdynge any necessite to thilke thinges that
Bo5 p6 128 thou byholdest present?”
Bo5 p6 129 “Nay,” quod I.
Bo5 p6 130 Philosophie. “Certes, thanne, yif men
Bo5 p6 131 myghte maken any digne comparysoun or
Bo5 p6 132 collacioun of the presence devyne and of the
Bo5 p6 133 presence of mankynde, ryght so as ye seen some
Bo5 p6 134 thinges in this temporel present, ryght so seeth
Bo5 p6 135 God alle thinges by his eterne present.
Bo5 p6 136 “Wherfore this devyne prescience ne chaungeth
Bo5 p6 137 nat the nature ne the proprete of thinges,
Bo5 p6 138 but byholdeth swiche thingis present to hym-ward
Bo5 p6 139 as thei shollen betyde to yow-ward
Bo5 p6 140 in tyme to comen. Ne it ne confowndeth
Bo5 p6 141 nat the jugementz of thingis; but by o
Bo5 p6 142 sight of his thought he knoweth the thinges
Bo5 p6 143 to comen, as wel necessarie as nat necessarie.
Bo5 p6 144 Ryght so as whan ye seen togidre a man walke
Bo5 p6 145 on the erthe and the sonne arisen in the
Bo5 p6 146 hevene, albeit so that ye seen and byholden the
Bo5 p6 147 ton and the tothir togidre, yit natheles ye demen
Bo5 p6 148 and discerne that the toon is voluntarie
Bo5 p6 149 and the tothir is necessarie. Ryght so
Bo5 p6 150 thanne the devyne lookynge, byholdynge
Bo5 p6 151 alle thinges undir hym, ne trowbleth nat
Bo5 p6 152 the qualite of thinges that ben certeinly present
Bo5 p6 153 to hym-ward but, as to the condicioun of tyme,
Bo5 p6 154 forsothe thei ben futur. For which it folwith that
Bo5 p6 155 this nis noon opynioun, but rathir a stidfast
Bo5 p6 156 knowynge istrengthid by soothnesse that, whan
Bo5 p6 157 that God knoweth any thing to be, he ne unwot
Bo5 p6 158 not that thilke thing wantith necessite to be.
Bo5 p6 159 (This is to sein that whan that God knoweth
Bo5 p6 160 any thing to betide, he wot wel that it ne
Bo5 p6 161 hath no necessite to betyde.)
Bo5 p6 162 “And yif thou seist here that thilke thing that
Bo5 p6 163 God seeth to betide, it ne may nat unbytide (as
Bo5 p6 164 who seith, it moot bytide), and thilke thing that
Bo5 p6 165 ne mai nat unbytide, it mot bytiden by necessite,
Bo5 p6 166 and that thou streyne me to this name of
Bo5 p6 167 necessite, certes I wol wel confessen and
Bo5 p6 168 byknowen a thing of ful sad trouthe. But
Bo5 p6 169 unnethe schal ther any wight mowe seen it
Bo5 p6 170 or come therto, but yif that he be
Bo5 p6 171 byholdere of the devyne thought. For I wol
Bo5 p6 172 answeren the thus: that thilke thing that is futur,
Bo5 p6 173 whan it is referred to the devyne knowynge,
Bo5 p6 174 than is it necessarie; but certis whan it is
Bo5 p6 175 undirstonden in his owene kynde, men seen it
Bo5 p6 176 outrely fre and absolut fro alle necessite.
Bo5 p6 177 “For certes ther ben two maneris of
Bo5 p6 178 necessites: that oon necessite is symple, as thus:
Bo5 p6 179 that it byhovith by necessite that alle men
Bo5 p6 180 ben mortal or dedly; anothir necessite is
Bo5 p6 181 condicionel, as thus: yif thow wost that a
Bo5 p6 182 man walketh, it byhovith by necessite that he
Bo5 p6 183 walke. Thilke thing, thanne, that any wight hath
Bo5 p6 184 iknowe to be, it ne mai ben noon oothir weys
Bo5 p6 185 thanne he knowith it to be. But this condicion ne
Bo5 p6 186 draweth nat with hir thilke necessite simple; for
Bo5 p6 187 certes this necessite condicionel — the propre
Bo5 p6 188 nature of it ne makith it nat, but the adjeccioun
Bo5 p6 189 of the condicioun makith it. For no necessite
Bo5 p6 190 ne constreyneth a man to gon that
Bo5 p6 191 goth by his propre wil, al be it so that whan
Bo5 p6 192 he goth that it is necessarie that he goth. Ryght
Bo5 p6 193 on this same manere thanne, yf that the
Bo5 p6 194 purveaunce of God seeth any thyng present,
Bo5 p6 195 than moot thilke thing ben by necessite,
Bo5 p6 196 althoghe that it ne have no necessite of his owne
Bo5 p6 197 nature. But certes the futures that bytiden by
Bo5 p6 198 fredom of arbitrie, God seth hem alle togidre
Bo5 p6 199 presentz. Thise thinges thanne, yif thei ben
Bo5 p6 200 referrid to the devyne sighte, than ben they
Bo5 p6 201 maked necessarie by the condicioun of the
Bo5 p6 202 devyne knowynge. But certes yif thilke thingis
Bo5 p6 203 ben considered by hemself, thei ben absolut of
Bo5 p6 204 necessite, and ne forleten nat ne cesen nat of
Bo5 p6 205 the liberte of hir owne nature. Thanne certes
Bo5 p6 206 withoute doute alle the thinges shollen ben
Bo5 p6 207 doon whiche that God woot byforn that thei ben
Bo5 p6 208 to comen. But some of hem comen and bytiden
Bo5 p6 209 of fre arbitrie or of fre wil, that, al be it so
Bo5 p6 210 that thei bytiden, yit algates ne lese thei nat
Bo5 p6 211 hir propre nature in beinge, by the whiche,
Bo5 p6 212 first or that thei weren idon, thei hadden power
Bo5 p6 213 noght to han bytyd.”
Bo5 p6 214 Boece. “What is this to seyn thanne,” quod I,
Bo5 p6 215 “that thinges ne ben nat necessarie by hir propre
Bo5 p6 216 nature, so as thei comen in alle maneris in the
Bo5 p6 217 liknesse of necessite by the condicioun of the
Bo5 p6 218 devyne science?”
Bo5 p6 219 Philosophie. “This is the difference,”
Bo5 p6 220 quod sche, “that tho thinges that I purposide
Bo5 p6 221 the a litil herbyforn — that is to seyn,
Bo5 p6 222 the sonne arysynge and the man walkynge —
Bo5 p6 223 that ther-whiles that thilke thinges ben idoon,
Bo5 p6 224 they ne myghte nat ben undoon; natheles that
Bo5 p6 225 oon of hem, or it was idoon, it byhovide by
Bo5 p6 226 necessite that it was idoon, but nat that oothir.
Bo5 p6 227 Ryght so is it here, that the thinges that God
Bo5 p6 228 hath present, withoute doute thei shollen ben.
Bo5 p6 229 But some of hem descendith of the nature
Bo5 p6 230 of thinges (as the sonne arysynge); and
Bo5 p6 231 some descendith of the power of the doeris
Bo5 p6 232 (as the man walkynge). Thanne seide I no wrong
Bo5 p6 233 that, yif that thise thinges ben referred to the
Bo5 p6 234 devyne knowynge, thanne ben thei necessarie;
Bo5 p6 235 and yif thei ben considered by hemself, than ben
Bo5 p6 236 thei absolut fro the boond of necessite. Right so
Bo5 p6 237 as alle thingis that apiereth or scheweth to the
Bo5 p6 238 wittes, yif thou referre it to resoun, it is
Bo5 p6 239 universel; and yif thou loke it or referre it
Bo5 p6 240 to itself, than is it singuler.
Bo5 p6 241 “But now yif thou seist thus: that, ‘If it be
Bo5 p6 242 in my power to chaunge my purpos, than schal
Bo5 p6 243 I voiden the purveaunce of God, whan paraventure
Bo5 p6 244 I schal han chaungid the thingis that
Bo5 p6 245 he knoweth byforn,’ thanne schal I answeren
Bo5 p6 246 the thus: ‘Certes thou maist wel chaungen thi
Bo5 p6 247 purpos; but for as mochil as the present
Bo5 p6 248 sothnesse of the devyne purveaunce byholdeth
Bo5 p6 249 that thou maist chaunge thi purpos, and
Bo5 p6 250 whethir thou wolt chaunge it or no, and
Bo5 p6 251 whider-ward that thou torne it, thou ne
Bo5 p6 252 maist nat eschuen the devyne prescience, ryght
Bo5 p6 253 as thou ne maist nat fleen the sighte of the
Bo5 p6 254 present eye, althoghe that thou torne thiself by
Bo5 p6 255 thi fre wil into diverse acciouns.’ But thou maist
Bo5 p6 256 sein ayein: ‘How schal it thanne be — schal nat
Bo5 p6 257 the devyne science ben chaunged by my
Bo5 p6 258 disposicioun whan that I wol o thing now and
Bo5 p6 259 now anothir? And thilke prescience — ne
Bo5 p6 260 semeth it nat to entrechaunge stoundis of
Bo5 p6 261 knowynge?'” (As who seith, ne schal it nat
Bo5 p6 262 seme to us that the devyne prescience entrechaungith
Bo5 p6 263 hise diverse stoundes of knowynge,
Bo5 p6 264 so that it knowe somtyme o thing, and somtyme
Bo5 p6 265 the contrarie?)
Bo5 p6 266 “No, forsothe,” quod she, “for the devyne
Bo5 p6 267 sighte renneth toforn and seeth alle futures, and
Bo5 p6 268 clepith hem ayen and retorneth hem to the
Bo5 p6 269 presence of his propre knowynge; ne he ne
Bo5 p6 270 entrechaungith nat, so as thou wenest, the
Bo5 p6 271 stoundes of foreknowynge, as now this,
Bo5 p6 272 now that; but he ay duellynge cometh byforn,
Bo5 p6 273 and enbraseth at o strook alle thi mutaciouns.
Bo5 p6 274 And this presence to comprehenden and to seen
Bo5 p6 275 alle thingis — God ne hath nat taken it of the
Bo5 p6 276 bytidynge of thinges to come, but of his propre
Bo5 p6 277 symplicite. And herby is assoiled thilke thing
Bo5 p6 278 that thou puttest a litel herebyforn; that is to
Bo5 p6 279 seyn, that it is unworthy thing to seyn that
Bo5 p6 280 our futures yeven cause of the science of
Bo5 p6 281 God. For certis this strengthe of the devyne
Bo5 p6 282 science, whiche that embraseth alle thinges by
Bo5 p6 283 his presentarie knowynge, establissheth manere
Bo5 p6 284 to alle thinges, and it ne oweth nawht to lattere
Bo5 p6 285 thinges.
Bo5 p6 286 “And syn that thise thinges ben thus (that is
Bo5 p6 287 to seyn, syn that necessite nis nat in thinges by
Bo5 p6 288 the devyne prescience), thanne is ther fredom of
Bo5 p6 289 arbitrie, that duelleth hool and unwemmed
Bo5 p6 290 to mortal men; ne the lawes ne purposen
Bo5 p6 291 nat wikkidly medes and peynes to the
Bo5 p6 292 willynges of men that ben unbownden and quyt
Bo5 p6 293 of alle necessite; and God, byholdere and
Bo5 p6 294 forwytere of alle thingis, duelleth above, and the
Bo5 p6 295 present eternite of his sighte renneth alwey with
Bo5 p6 296 the diverse qualite of our dedes, dispensynge
Bo5 p6 297 and ordeynynge medes to gode men and
Bo5 p6 298 tormentz to wikkide men. Ne in ydel ne in veyn
Bo5 p6 299 ne ben ther put in God hope and preyeris
Bo5 p6 300 that ne mowen nat ben unspedful ne
Bo5 p6 301 withouten effect whan they been ryghtful.
Bo5 p6 302 “Withstond thanne and eschue thou vices;
Bo5 p6 303 worschipe and love thou vertues; areise thi
Bo5 p6 304 corage to ryghtful hopes; yilde thou humble
Bo5 p6 305 preieres an heyhe. Gret necessite of prowesse
Bo5 p6 306 and vertu is encharged and comaunded to yow,
Bo5 p6 307 yif ye nil nat dissimulen; syn that ye worken and
Bo5 p6 308 don (that is to seyn, your dedes or your werkes)
Bo5 p6 309 byforn the eyen of the juge that seeth and
Bo5 p6 310 demeth alle thinges.”